

CENTRAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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May 23, 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Studies of Intelligence Crisis Support

The NSCIC Working Group has completed three studies of the support provided by intelligence agencies to policymakers during periods of international crises. These studies reviewed the Arab-Israeli Cease-fire of 1970, the Jordanian Civil War of 1970 and the India-Pakistan War of 1971. The attached report summarizes the Working Group's observations on the major problems brought out by the studies and makes recommendations concerning appropriate guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence.

May we please have by June 15 your comments on the conclusions and recommendations of the Working Group. In addition, the DCI is requested to prepare by the same date his recommended plan for acting on the issues raised by the Working Group. At the time these papers are submitted to us, copies should also be provided to the other members of the NSCIC. A meeting of the NSCIC to discuss the Working Group's report, the agencies' responses, and the DCI's plan will be scheduled at a later date.

Jean W. Davis
Staff Secretary

~~SECRET~~ - GDS

Note: ^{PR/7} ~~DDI~~ has action for DCI on this.

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Studies of Intelligence Crisis Support

(U) By memorandum of 23 May your staff requested comment on the report of conclusions and recommendations of the Working Group of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, drawn from the three post-mortem studies which the Group has completed so far on intelligence support during crisis situations.

(S) I have reviewed these conclusions and recommendations and am in general agreement with their substance. With regard to the need for better two-way communication between policy-makers and intelligence producers, my policy staff makes the point that in their recollection this communication did function during each of these crises at a better level of effectiveness than the Working Group report would lead one to believe. However, the measures proposed for a more positive set of formal arrangements for liaison and for monitoring the flow of intelligence support seem sound and useful.

(U) I have the following points to suggest as modifications and additions to these arrangements.

(S) First, I note that the Working Group report recommends (paragraph 13, pages 4-5) that the DCI appoint a senior representative for crisis liaison and monitoring of support to the NSC machinery, and that this individual should, as his primary qualification, have "a broad understanding of the region in which the crisis is centered" (underscoring mine). It seems to me that this focus on regional expertise misses the point. In the first place, the DCI's man should be sufficiently senior to speak for the DCI and have access to the same official levels, if need be, as the DCI himself does. This face-to-face contact is the most effective means of solving the fundamental problem of communication

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between high-level users and producers. To insure this personal contact, a level of seniority above that normally occupied by a regional expert is called for. Second, those crises in which the U.S. is involved take on their primary importance in terms of the potential confrontation between ourselves and other major powers. The region provides the setting, but the local issues are transcended by those of the great power relationships involved.

(S) Elsewhere (page 3), the Working Group report speaks precisely to this point when it notes that intelligence analysts (who are regional specialists) have lacked a sufficiently broad perspective on the crisis, especially on Soviet and CPR roles and intentions, and have failed to share the broader concerns of the policy staffs whom they support. I would suggest, therefore, that sufficient seniority to act as alter ego for the DCI and a broad knowledge of current national security issues be substituted for regional expertise as the primary qualifications for the DCI's senior crisis liaison and support monitoring officials.

(S) With regard to post mortem studies of future crisis situations, I suggest that these be prepared for by adopting procedures in advance of future crises which will enable better reconstruction of what actually happened than can be obtained from the memories of participants and normal administrative records. Purposeful, albeit informal, records of intelligence actions should be compiled at the time they happen, if we are later to measure accurately how well intelligence responded, and what improvements are needed.

(U) I also suggest that future studies take up some of the crisis intelligence support which did not surface in the examples studied so far. Specifically, the problems of simultaneous crises in different areas and of communications with policy staff echelons below the NSC machinery and those outside of Washington might well be addressed.

(S) As a last point, I believe that a more positive approach should be taken to study and decide on problems of third party support than is contained in the report. Since our reliance on such support during a future crisis is already evident, we should study each such situation now, and make definite policy decision on quid pro quo, security policies, confidence

Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100040091-1

levels expected, and other key aspects. This reduces the need for ad hoc decisions to be made hastily as a crisis impends or proceeds.

(U) I suggest that the NSCIC include the above points in their guidance on the report to the DCI.

H. P. Clement